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Abstract
Over the past two decades, Ginsburg and Jablonka have developed a novel approach 
to studying the evolutionary origins of consciousness: the Unlimited Associative 
Learning (UAL) framework. The central idea is that there is a distinctive type of 
learning that can serve as a transition marker for the evolutionary transition from 
non-conscious to conscious life. The goal of this paper is to stimulate discussion of 
the framework by providing a primer on its key claims (Part I) and a clear statement 
of its main empirical predictions (Part II).
Keywords Consciousness · Learning · Unlimited associative learning · Evolution · 
Evolutionary transitions · Transition marker
Introduction
A conscious system—an experiencing subject—has a subjective point of view on 
the world and on its own body. The system is capable of generating that elusive 
property that philosophers call phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). It feels like 
something to be that system. Somewhere in nature there is a line between systems 
with no conscious experiences at all, like cyclones, stars and volcanoes, and those 
that do have at least some conscious experiences, like humans. Finding that line, and 
understanding how it was crossed, is a major challenge for science and philosophy 
(Godfrey-Smith 2019).
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Over the past 2 decades, Ginsburg and Jablonka have developed a novel approach 
to studying the evolutionary origins of consciousness: the Unlimited Associative 
Learning (UAL) framework (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2007a, b, 2010a, b,  2015; 
Bronfman et al. 2016a, b). This work culminated in their recent book, The Evolu-
tion of the Sensitive Soul: Learning and the Origins of Consciousness (Ginsburg 
and Jablonka 2019). The approach, if it succeeds, promises to place origins of con-
sciousness research on a firm theoretical and methodological footing, in a deliberate 
attempt to replicate the way origins of life research was placed on firmer founda-
tions by the work of Gánti, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry. In a review of the book, 
Birch (2020) posed some problems for the UAL approach and highlighted the need 
for more explicit predictions. Here, our aim is to stimulate discussion of the UAL 
framework by providing a primer on its key claims (Part I) and a clear statement of 
its main empirical predictions (Part II).
Part I: Primer
Transition markers
At the heart of the UAL approach is the concept of an evolutionary transition 
marker. A transition marker is a property such that, when we find evidence of it, we 
have evidence that the major evolutionary transition in which we are interested has 
gone to completion.
The concept can be illustrated with the case of the origin of life. No one agrees 
precisely what life is. Nevertheless, there is a viable programme of origin of life 
research, built around a shared grasp of what it is the field aims to explain. There 
is enough consensus to make this possible, despite the lack of any consensus on a 
theory of the nature of life.
This is because there is consensus around a list of capacities that are jointly suf-
ficient for life, capacities Gánti (2003) described as hallmarks of life. These capaci-
ties include maintenance of a boundary (individuation), metabolism, stability, infor-
mation storage, regulation of the internal milieu, growth, reproduction, and death 
(eventual disintegration). The functional and structural coupling among the mecha-
nisms and processes that implement these capacities constitute a living entity. There 
is some variation among the lists of hallmarks one finds in the literature, but a great 
deal of overlap.
When we have a list of capacities jointly sufficient for life, we can then ask: Is 
there some single positive marker that requires the existence of systems with all 
of these capacities? Gánti (2003) and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) pro-
posed that there is: unlimited heredity. Unlimited heredity is the capacity to form 
lineages of open-ended length, varying in open-ended ways from the initial system. 
The DNA-based heredity system of all life on Earth is an example (and the only 
known biochemical example) of an unlimited heredity system. The point is not that 
DNA-based heredity operates entirely without constraint, but that the possibilities 
are sufficiently open-ended that there is no serious prospect of all of the possible 
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morphological forms it can produce being explored by real lineages, even given a 
timescale on the order of the age of the universe.
A case can be made that there could be no unlimited heredity in the world with-
out the existence of systems that possess all the hallmarks of life: individuation, 
metabolism, stability, information storage, regulation of the internal milieu, growth, 
reproduction, and death (Gánti 2003; Bronfman et al. 2016b). It is tempting here to 
object: What about viruses? But it is no problem for the claim that unlimited heredity 
is impossible without life if there are some non-living systems that possess unlimited 
heredity, provided their ability to realize this property is dependent on a living host, as 
is the case with viruses. A “virus-only” world, devoid of living hosts, is impossible. A 
lengthy, self-replicating RNA in an unstructured chemical “soup” will be ephemeral. 
An even stronger argument can be applied to a computer virus. The genetic algorithm 
that underlies its “replication” operates on a long sequence of digits, which constitute 
an unlimited heredity system. But this artificial heredity system is the product of a 
living system (a human designer), and a world in which artificial unlimited heredity 
systems evolve first, before biological unlimited heredity systems, is impossible. The 
key idea here is that we can distinguish between original (or primary) and derived (or 
secondary) ways of achieving unlimited heredity. The derived ways would not be pos-
sible unless the world had, at least at some point, contained the original way.
Granting that there could be no unlimited heredity without living systems, 
unlimited heredity provides a useful explanatory target for origin of life research. 
Researchers can ask: Can we date the origin of unlimited heredity to a particular 
geological period? Can we construct models of systems that are minimally suffi-
cient to generate unlimited heredity?1 Can we model how those systems might have 
evolved? Agreeing on a transition marker allows theoretical and empirical research 
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Fig. 1  Unlimited heredity as a transition marker for the origin of life. Unlimited heredity requires (in its 
original, primary implementation) a set of capacities that suffice (given the actual laws of nature) for life
1 Gánti’s chemoton model, which consists of three coupled subsystems—an autocatalytic metabolic 
engine, a self-assembling membrane subsystem, and a digital polymer system—forms a functional unit 
manifesting all the properties of life.
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amount of underlying divergence in views about the fundamental nature of life 
(Fig. 1).
Life is not consciousness, but the case of life illustrates the general idea of a tran-
sition marker. In abstract terms, we can use the term “mode of being” to refer to the 
end-point of a major evolutionary transition. Life is a mode of being, and so is con-
sciousness.2 To find a transition marker, we first to find a set of capacities that jointly 
suffices, given the actual laws of nature, for the biologically evolved mode of being 
we want to explain. We then identify a single property that requires, at least in its 
original, primary implementation, the existence of systems with all of those capaci-
ties. That property is our transition marker (Fig. 2).
Sufficient conditions for consciousness
How can this strategy be applied to the case of consciousness, or subjective experi-
ence? Here too, we find a wide variety of theories about the nature of the phenom-
enon of interest, and a glaring absence of consensus. Our first task is to find hidden 
consensus behind the apparent disagreement by identifying a list of capacities that 
consciousness researchers would generally regard as jointly sufficient for a system 
being an experiencing subject—a subject with a point of view on the world and on 
its own body.
Like Gánti, we can construct a plausible list of hallmarks. First, there is global 
accessibility and broadcast: a minimal global workspace (in the sense of Dehaene 
2014) where information from perception, memory and evaluative systems is 
LIST OF CAPACITIES 
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Fig. 2  The general idea of a transition marker. A transition marker marks the presence of a mode of 
being (e.g. life, consciousness) by virtue of requiring (at least in its original, primary implementation) a 
set of capacities that suffice (given the actual laws of nature) for that mode of being
2 For more on the concept of a “mode of being”, see Ginsburg and Jablonka (2020). Ginsburg and 
Jablonka also identify a third major mode of being, the “rational-reflective” mode. This three-way dis-
tinction between living, conscious and rational-reflective modes of being is intended to map approxi-
mately on to Aristotle’s distinction between nutritive, sensitive and rational souls.
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integrated and broadcast back to these and other systems.3 Second, there is bind-
ing/unification and differentiation: objects (e.g. a blue box) are perceived, not just 
fragmented features (boxness and blueness). Third, there is selective attention and 
exclusion: there are mechanisms for making some stimuli more salient than others. 
Fourth, there is intentionality: the capacity to represent the world and one’s own 
body. Fifth, there is integration of information over time, not just at a single time. 
Sixth, there is an evaluative system. Seventh, there is agency and embodiment. 
Eighth, and finally, there is registration of a self/other distinction.4 These hallmarks 
can be characterised in neural, cognitive, behaviour and phenomenological terms, 
as described in Table 1, although (of course) they will only have phenomenological 
manifestations in animals that are conscious. Further elaboration of each of these 
hallmarks can be found in Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019, Ch. 3, 5 and 8).
The longer and more demanding the list, the more plausible it is that it suffices 
for consciousness. No one is saying here that any of these properties is necessary 
for consciousness. That is not the point. Even a panpsychist could accept the claim 
that the above list suffices for a system being an experiencing subject, although they 
will feel it goes far beyond what is necessary. Moreover, the relevant notion of “suf-
ficiency” in this context is sufficiency in living organisms given the actual laws of 
nature. So our criteria are not intended to be sufficient in the sense of metaphysi-
cal sufficiency: sufficiency in all possible worlds. The relevant notion is what phi-
losophers call nomological sufficiency, and it is relative to a specific material sub-
strate—living organisms. The metaphysical possibility (or otherwise) of “zombies” 
is therefore irrelevant to the sufficiency claim.
The next question is: Is there some single positive marker that requires the exist-
ence of systems with all of these capacities? Here there is a temptation to appeal 
to some uniquely human trait, such as sophisticated language, cumulative culture, 
symbolic art, or the ability to report one’s experiences verbally. These could techni-
cally serve as transition markers, but they would be unambitious and of little use. In 
effect, a transition marker gives a “no later than” timepoint for dating the evolution-
ary origin of consciousness. These markers would say: the transition was completed 
no later than the origin of behaviourally modern Homo sapiens. They would there-
fore tell us nothing we don’t already know, since no one seriously doubts that behav-
iourally modern Homo sapiens post-dates the origin of consciousness.
The real question is: Can we identify a more ambitious, more useful transition 
marker that allows us to push the end-point of the transition further back in time? 
In other words: Can we find a property that requires all the above hallmarks of con-
sciousness, yet is possessed by a wide range of non-human animals? A property that 
is, so to speak, “as simple as possible, but not simpler”?5
3 We say “minimal” because we take it that some elements of some presentations of the global work-
space, such as broadcast to mechanisms of verbal report and planning (e.g. Dehaene and Changeux 2011, 
p. 209) are not necessary for consciousness.
4 In Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019), agency, embodiment and registration of self are listed under one 
heading, because of their substantial overlap.
5 This line is often attributed to Einstein, but there is in fact no clear provenance for the remark.
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Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL)
The central postulate of the UAL framework is that we can, and that the transition 
marker is Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL). What is Unlimited Associative 
Learning? In broad terms, it is the within-lifetime analogue of unlimited heredity. 
A system with a capacity for unlimited heredity can give rise to lineages of open-
ended future variation and open-ended evolution. A system with a capacity for UAL 
can, within its own lifetime, learn about the world and about itself in an open-ended 
way. As with unlimited heredity, the point is not that the process is entirely free of 
constraint, but that the possibilities are sufficiently open-ended that there is no seri-
ous prospect of all of the possible associative links it can produce being formed by a 
real organism with a realistic, finite lifespan.
We can be more precise about what UAL involves. It is associative learning with 
five crucial features that distinguish it from more limited forms:
1. Compound stimuli The conditioned stimulus can be a compound of discriminable 
perceptual features arranged in a pattern (e.g. a black-and-yellow buzzing object 
with a particular odour). These features may be in different sense modalities or 
in a single sense modality.
2. Novel stimuli The conditioned stimulus can be novel to the animal, in the sense 
that it is neither reflex eliciting nor pre-associated with an unconditioned stimulus 
or with past reinforcement. Moreover, the stimulus can be both novel and com-
pound (e.g. a novel, complex pattern).
3. Second-order conditioning There is second-order as well as first-order condition-
ing. A conditioned stimulus can be associated with some other novel, compound 
conditioned stimulus or action, and so on, allowing the organism to build up long 
chains of associative links between stimuli and actions in an open-ended way.
4. Trace conditioning there can be a time gap (and no overlap) between the con-
ditional and unconditional stimulus. There is an escape from immediacy, since 
the organisms can learn how stimuli that are no longer present relate to current 
stimuli.
5. Flexible, easily rewritable associations with value the positive or negative value 
of a stimulus or action can change quickly and flexibly in response to changes in 
the world. If a reinforcer is devalued (as in “outcome devaluation” paradigms; 
Holland and Rescorla 1975; Adams and Dickinson 1981), the animal will quickly 
adapt.6
Part of the UAL framework is that these enhanced forms of associative learn-
ing form a natural cluster. They have some overlapping features and are therefore 
not completely separate capacities which evolved completely independently from 
each other. Let us take the capacity for discrimination learning of novel, compound 
6 The presentation of UAL in Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019) listed only components 1–3, but they also 
discussed flexible, easily rewritable associations with value and the ability to bridge temporal gaps, as 
essential attributes of UAL (see, for example, pp. 234, 235, 368, 402).
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stimuli (features 1 and 2). In realistic ecological conditions, such learning involves 
pattern completion. Pattern completion is a form of associative learning: the ability 
to associate a partial pattern with the completed pattern. Once the completed pat-
tern is associated with a positive or negative valence, learning to associate other 
things with the partial pattern can be considered second-order conditioning (feature 
3). Moreover, the ability to discriminate between patterns requires that a previously 
perceived pattern is kept in working memory for a period of time while another pat-
tern is scrutinized (feature 4). And in real environments the relationship between a 
completed pattern and reward can change quickly (e.g. a food source can suddenly 
acquire a nearby predator), so features 1–4 will be of little use unless the associa-
tions with value thus formed can be rewritten (feature 5). The various elements of 
UAL do not logically imply each other but they do depend on each other in realistic 
ecological settings.
Why think that UAL, thus defined, is a good transition marker? Because it plausi-
bly requires the existence of functionally coupled systems with all of the hallmarks 
of consciousness (Fig. 3). Some basic form of global accessibility and broadcast is 
plausibly needed to enable integration of information from multiple sense modal-
ities. Some basic form of binding and differentiation is needed to construct com-
pound stimuli. Some basic form of selective attention and exclusion is needed to 
pick these stimuli out from the background. Some basic form of intentionality is 
needed, since there must be some way in which the system represents stimuli when 
storing associative links. Some form of integration over time is needed to learn 
chains of associations between actions. Some basic form of evaluation system is 
needed to make classical conditioning and discrimination, based on reinforcement, 
possible at all. Some basic form of agency is needed for action selection, and thus 
making learning of associations between actions possible. Embodiment is needed to 
make agency possible. Finally, some basic form of self-other registration is needed 
so that the organism can distinguish between its own actions (and their “reaffer-
ent” effects on its sensory input) and stimuli generated by the external world, and 
thereby learn about the world and about the consequences of its own actions without 
• Global accessibility and broadcast 
• Binding/unificaon 
• Selecve aenon and exclusion 
• Intenonality 
• Integra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Fig. 3  Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) as a transition marker for the origin of consciousness
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conflating the two. In short, all the hallmarks of consciousness are needed (Bronf-
man et al. 2016a, b; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019, Ch. 5). As in the case of life, the 
myriad of mechanisms underlying UAL in living organisms, constitute (are building 
blocks of and are nomologically sufficient for) biological consciousness. However, 
UAL is only a positive marker: it can tell us which animals are conscious, but it does 
not aspire to tell us which are not.
Just as one might be tempted to hold up viruses as a counterexample to unlimited 
heredity as a transition marker for life, one might be tempted to point to future or 
even current AI systems as counterexamples to UAL as a transition marker for con-
sciousness. Isn’t it conceivable that AI could achieve genuinely open-ended associa-
tive learning with few, if any, of the hallmarks of consciousness in our list? But, as 
with viruses, this objection rests on a misunderstanding of what a transition marker 
is supposed to provide. It may be possible for conscious, embodied biological sys-
tems like Homo sapiens to design new, non-embodied, non-biological realizations of 
UAL which lack the hallmarks of consciousness. But these products of human intelli-
gent design would not be the original, biologically evolved implementations of UAL, 
and they would owe their existence to these biologically evolved implementations. 
Their capacity to perform UAL would be derived from the capacity of an embod-
ied, biological system to perform UAL. As a result, they are not a counterexample to 
the claim that there could be no UAL in a world in which experiencing subjects had 
never evolved, and they are not a counterexample to the claim that UAL can serve as 
a transition marker for the evolutionary origin of consciousness in living organisms.
UAL is well-equipped to play a role in origins of consciousness research that par-
allels that played by unlimited heredity in origins of life research. Researchers can 
ask: Which extant species are capable of UAL? Can we date the origin of UAL to a 
particular geological period? Can we construct models of systems that are minimally 
sufficient to generate UAL? Can we model how those systems might have evolved? 
Agreeing on a transition marker allows theoretical and empirical research pro-
grammes to aim at a single, common goal, despite a potentially significant amount 
of underlying divergence in views about the fundamental nature of consciousness.
The distribution of UAL in the animal kingdom
To the best of our knowledge, which animals are capable of UAL? It is not easy 
to say at present, because animal cognition researchers have not been specifically 
looking for the whole UAL package. They have, however, looked for the individual 
elements of UAL in various species, and this allows for evidence-based conjectures 
about which taxa are most likely to possess the whole package.
Second-order conditioning, trace conditioning, and discriminative learning on 
novel, compound stimuli were found some time ago in rats, rabbits, pigeons, and 
goldfish.7 But, as far as we know, they were always studied separately: an ability to 
do second-order trace conditioning on compound stimuli was never directly tested. 
7 Evidence for second-order conditioning in rats, rabbits and pigeons is reviewed by Gewirtz and Davies 
(2000). Second-order conditioning was found in goldfish by Farr and Savage (1978). Evidence for com-
pound conditioning in rats, rabbits, pigeons and goldfish is briefly reviewed in Couvillon and Bitterman 
1 3
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What we can say at the moment is that it seems very plausible that these animals 
possess the whole UAL package, given that they can demonstrate separate elements 
of the package on separate occasions.
Much the same can be said of honey bees (Apis genus) and fruit flies (Drosoph-
ila genus). Honey bees and fruit flies can learn associations between novel, com-
pound visual stimuli (Couvillon and Bitterman 1988; Brembs and Heisenberg 2000; 
Schubert et al. 2002) and they can do second-order conditioning on olfactory stim-
uli (Hussaini et  al. 2007; Tabone and de Belle 2011). There is also evidence of a 
simple form of trace conditioning on olfactory stimuli, though it is hard to be sure, 
with olfactory stimuli, that the conditioned stimulus has really gone by the time the 
unconditioned stimulus has arrived (Shuai et  al. 2011; Szyszka et  al. 2011; Dylla 
et al. 2013, 2017). So, we can credibly conjecture that they possess the whole UAL 
package, but we do not have hard evidence of this. As we argue in Part II, it is pos-
sible to test the relation between different aspects of UAL and consciousness. Yet, 
it remains conceivable that visual and olfactory learned discriminations rely on dis-
tinct mechanisms that both fall short of UAL.
Based on a review of the animal learning literature, Ginsburg and Jablonka 
(2019) conjecture that UAL is present in most vertebrates, some cephalopod mol-
luscs (the coleoid cephalopods: octopods, squid and cuttlefish) and some arthropods 
(including honey bees and fruit flies). In these taxa it is also possible to identify the 
brain regions underlying processes of unification, dedicated memory systems for the 
storage of compound precepts, dedicated value systems, regions dedicated to motor 
programmes, and sensory-motor associative areas (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019, 
Table 8.2).
On the basis of the literature, Ginsburg and Jablonka conjecture that UAL is 
absent in other invertebrate taxa, including gastropod molluscs (such as Aplysia sea 
slugs), annelids and nematodes. There is associative learning in these taxa, but it 
seems likely to be too limited to count as UAL. However, as they caution, the learn-
ing abilities of many species in species-rich taxa like molluscs and annelids have not 
been sufficiently studied, so the distribution of UAL may be broader than currently 
assumed.
Attempting to trace the origins of UAL and some of its evolutionary effects
One of the functions of a transition marker is to help us date (in a “no later than” 
fashion) the transition in question. If UAL is our transition marker, what does it 
tell us about the timing of the transition from non-conscious to conscious beings? 
Unless UAL is much more widespread in the animal kingdom than suggested above, 
it hints at three separate origin events for conscious experience: one in the verte-
brate lineage, one in the arthropods, and one in the coleoid cephalopod molluscs. If 
UAL is present in all or most extant vertebrates, this points to an origin event in the 
(1988), who go on to present evidence of compound conditioning in honey bees. For studies of trace con-
ditioning see Lucas et al. (1981) (pigeons), Bangasser et al. (2006) (rats), Moyer et al. (2015) (rabbits); 
Rodríguez-Expósito et al. (2017) (goldfish).
Footnote 7 (continued)
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vertebrate case no later than the origin of the vertebrates, in the Cambrian period. 
A similar hypothesis has been reached, via a very different route, by Feinberg and 
Mallatt (2016).
A further claim defended by Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019), logically independ-
ent of the core components of the UAL framework, is that associative learning, 
both limited and unlimited did not just originate in the Cambrian explosion, but 
was one of the major driving forces behind that explosion. The Cambrian explo-
sion saw a sudden and dramatic diversification of animal forms. Over evolutionary 
time, lineages were rapidly discovering new niches and evolving to occupy them. 
What explains this rapid pace of change? Ginsburg and Jablonka’s hypothesis is that 
associative learning, a form of developmental plasticity with clear potential for gen-
erating adaptive novelty, enabled organisms to develop novel behaviours within a 
single lifetime. They learned to exploit new environmental resources and to colo-
nize new niches. Their abilities to adapt through learning allowed them to be more 
effective predators, more discriminating mates, and more evasive prey. Associative 
learning, and especially UAL, exerted great selection pressure on interacting spe-
cies, which had to evolve to cope with the formidable UAL animals, or perish. This 
led to co-evolutionary arms races that drove the dramatic adaptive diversification of 
the Cambrian.
However, UAL, like every major innovation, led to new challenging problems 
and therefore was likely to have driven the evolution of mechanisms that amelio-
rate them. An urgent problem that UAL created was over-learning: since similar pat-
terns may have different valences, pattern completion may sometimes lead to many 
false alarms. For example, a partial pattern of vibrations may sometimes be associ-
ated with a predator and sometimes with a nonthreatening passing animal, but since 
flight is less costly than injury, overreaction to the unthreatening cue is inevitable 
(the “smoke detector principle”, as coined by Nesse 2001). Over-reaction due to 
over-learning implies that animals are more often stressed. Since stress is physiolog-
ically costly leading to a greater propensity for disease (e.g., Liu et al. 2017; Everly 
and Lating 2019), it is expected that once associative learning and especially UAL 
evolved, ameliorating mechanisms such as the stress response, transgenerational 
inheritance of stress responses, and active forgetting, were more likely to evolve in 
UAL animals.
Summary of the UAL framework
We will close this primer with a summary of the key claims of the UAL framework:
(0) In general, a transition marker is a property that requires a package of mecha-
nisms and processes sufficient for a particular mode of being (e.g. life, con-
sciousness), so that it provides a useful positive marker of when an evolutionary 
transition to that mode of being has gone to completion. Agreeing on a transition 
marker allows a research programme to unite around a shared set of questions 
(Can we date the marker to a particular geological period? Can we construct 
models of systems that are minimally sufficient to generate the marker? Can we 
1 3
Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of… Page 13 of 23    56 
model how those systems might have evolved?) despite substantial underlying 
disagreement about the fundamental nature of the mode of being in question.
(1) Unlimited Associative Learning (UAL) is the capacity for associative learning 
on novel, compound stimuli, with the potential for second-order conditioning 
and trace conditioning, allowing for the open-ended accumulation of long chains 
of associative links during an animal’s lifetime. It includes the ability to bridge 
temporal gaps: to learn about conditional stimuli that are no longer present. UAL 
is posited to be a natural cluster—a cluster of enhanced learning abilities that 
are closely linked.
(2) UAL is a transition marker for the transition to experiencing systems—systems 
with points of view on the world and on their own bodies, with states that feel 
like something to be in. This is because UAL, when implemented in a living 
organism, requires a package of underlying mechanisms and processes that are 
sufficient (given the actual laws of nature) for conscious experience.
(3) Given current evidence (which is admittedly limited) we can credibly conjecture 
that UAL (and thus conscious experience) is possessed by most vertebrates, 
some arthropods, and coleoid cephalopods. The framework does not rule out 
conscious experience in a wider range of invertebrates.
(4) This points towards an initial origin for UAL in the Cambrian period. This in 
turn leads to the conjecture that UAL, being a form of developmental plastic-
ity particularly likely to generate adaptive novelty, played a role in driving the 
Cambrian explosion and drove the evolution of traits that partially compensated 
for its costs.
Part II: Predictions
Part I highlighted five key claims of the UAL framework. One was that agreeing 
on a transition marker is an important step for origins of consciousness research, 
because it allows researchers to unite around a shared agenda despite substantial 
disagreement about the nature of consciousness (claim 0). This claim is not testable. 
However, the other four claims are all testable. In Part II, we ask: how can claims 
(1)–(4) be tested? What new data is needed to either confirm or refute the core com-
mitments of the UAL framework?
Testing Claim 1: UAL is a natural cluster
A core component of the UAL approach is that UAL is not just a list of five inde-
pendent learning abilities that improve on more limited forms of associative learn-
ing. These abilities are taken to form a natural cluster—a cluster of correlated abil-
ities which are enabled by the overlapping underlying mechanisms. This leads to 
three main predictions.
The first is that the five elements of UAL are ontogenetically correlated. Discrim-
ination learning on novel, compound stimuli, second-order conditioning, trace con-
ditioning, and flexible revaluing (and devaluing) of stimuli and actions are partially 
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overlapping capacities, requiring many of the same mechanisms. This leads to the 
prediction that they will not develop completely independently of each other. The 
development of one of the five elements is expected to facilitate or enable the devel-
opment of another element which may in turn affect the further development of the 
first element. The co-developmental relations may be different in vertebrates, arthro-
pods and coleoid cephalopods.
The second is that the five elements of UAL are phylogenetically correlated. Due 
to the interdependencies between the elements explained in Part I, we expect that 
elements of UAL will be correlated in evolutionary terms. If a species is found to 
have evolved one of the elements of UAL (e.g. trace conditioning), this significantly 
increases the probability that it will also be found to have evolved the other elements 
(e.g., second-order conditioning). The prediction is that there will be substantial 
positive correlation between the elements, but the correlation need not be perfect. 
There could be some cases in which one or more of the elements of UAL evolved 
separately, without the rest of the package. The prediction is rather that the pres-
ence of one of the five elements raises the probability of finding the others. Sub-
stantial comparative data is needed to test this hypothesis: we first need to know the 
taxonomic distribution of the five elements of UAL in order to assess the correlation 
between these distributions.
The third prediction is that, in a UAL-possessing species, brain injuries that affect 
one element of the UAL cluster will affect some of the other elements. For example, 
hippocampal damage impairs trace conditioning in humans, rabbits and rats (Ban-
gasser et  al. 2006; Raybuck and Lattal 2014; McEchron et  al. 1998; Moyer et  al. 
2015). The prediction is that, to the extent that trace conditioning is impaired, the 
other elements of UAL should also be impaired to some extent. Second-order con-
ditioning and discrimination learning on novel, compound stimuli that require per-
ceptual mapping and working memory are expected to be impaired. The elements 
of UAL should be, so to speak, medically correlated—damage that affects one part 
of the cluster should not leave the rest entirely unaffected, even though it may leave 
more limited forms of learning unaffected.
Testing Claim 2: UAL is a transition marker for the transition to experiencing 
systems
The claim that UAL is a transition marker relies on the idea that a suite of mech-
anisms that (nomologically) suffices for subjective experience is also required (in 
biological systems) for UAL (Fig. 3). This leads to a basic prediction: if informa-
tion about a stimulus does not reach the mechanisms in question, it will be neither 
subjectively experienced nor accessible to UAL. Subjective experience of a stim-
ulus and accessibility of that stimulus to UAL should come and go together. This 
basic prediction is what we need to test, and the evidence must come from humans, 
because it is only in humans that we can independently verify, through verbal report, 
that a stimulus was consciously experienced. There are three main ways to test the 
basic prediction.
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The first involves experimental protocols that manipulate whether or not a par-
ticular stimulus reaches subjective experience. Such protocols include backward 
masking, the attentional blink, and distracting tasks that lead to inattentional blind-
ness (for examples and discussion see Dehaene 2014). The prediction is that, if the 
subject reports that they were never consciously aware of the stimulus—that they 
never experienced it—then the forms of learning that constitute UAL will never be 
performed on that stimulus, even though more limited forms of learning in rela-
tion to that stimulus may still be observed. For example, trace conditioning will 
be impossible, though delay conditioning may remain possible (Clark et al. 2002). 
Second-order conditioning of compound stimuli will be impossible, but first-order 
conditioning may still be observed. Discrimination learning involving simple stimuli 
may be observed, but discrimination learning when the stimulus is novel and com-
pound will not be observed. Association of stimuli and actions with reward may 
still be observed, but rapid devaluation and revaluation—rapid rewriting of the links 
between stimulus, action and reward—will not be observed.
The second way involves subjects with blindsight, a condition that switches off 
conscious perception in a particular region of the visual field while leaving uncon-
scious perception intact (Weiskrantz et al. 1974; Weiskrantz 2010). The prediction is 
that subjects who lack conscious perception in a given region of the visual field will 
be unable to perform UAL on any stimuli presented in that region, but more limited 
forms of associative learning may still be observed in relation to those stimuli. We 
should expect to find all the same dissociations between unlimited and limited forms 
of learning that we find in healthy subjects with masking and related protocols. 
Although blindsight is specifically a visual phenomenon, there is some evidence 
(albeit less compelling evidence) of related phenomena in other sense modalities 
(for hearing see Brogaard et al. 2017; for olfaction see Zucco et al. 2015).
The third path to relevant evidence involves the neural signatures of subjec-
tive experience. There is continuing debate about the neural signatures of experi-
ence in humans. Various potential neural signatures have been identified (reviewed 
in Dehaene 2014, Chapter  4). A specific type of neural oscillation (the gamma 
wave) has long been thought to be important, although not everyone agrees about 
this. A specific type of event-related potential (the P3 wave) also seems to matter. 
Conscious experience seems to result not from localised brain activity in a specific 
region, but rather from brain activity that implicates many different regions of the 
cortex, as well as the thalamus. Some take the prefrontal cortex at the front of the 
brain to play a special role (Dehaene 2014), whereas others emphasize a “posterior 
hot zone” at the back of the brain (Boly et al. 2017). Others highlight the signifi-
cance of thalamocortical loops (e.g., Llinás 2003). Global ignition—the ultra-fast 
spread of activity across the entire cortex—has also been suggested as a potential 
signature (Noy et al. 2015).
To state our prediction, we don’t need to take sides on which of these are truly 
neural signatures of experience, or on the issue of whether the front or back of the 
neocortex is more important to subjective experience in humans. Our prediction is 
simply this: the neural signatures that a stimulus is consciously represented (in a 
given taxon) will also be neural signatures of the accessibility of that stimulus to 
UAL (in a given taxon). For example, if global ignition turns out to be an important 
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neural signature of conscious representation of a stimulus in mammals, then global 
ignition will also be found when a stimulus is accessible to UAL. And this correla-
tion is predicted to be robust across at least mammalian species, and perhaps more 
broadly: finding global ignition in a given species will be positively correlated with 
finding UAL in that species. To reiterate, however, the UAL framework does not 
make predictions at the level of specific neural signatures. What it predicts is that 
the neural signatures of experience, whatever they turn out to be, will also be cor-
related with UAL.
Testing Claim 3: UAL (and thus conscious experience) is possessed by most 
vertebrates, some arthropods, and coleoid cephalopods
Although there is some evidence that UAL is present in most vertebrates, some 
arthropods and few molluscs, the precise distribution of UAL in these phyla is not 
known. There is huge variability in cognitive capacities among vertebrates, arthro-
pods and molluscs, but only for a few species in each phylum do we have substantial 
data about their learning abilities (for a summary of the learning literature see Gins-
burg and Jablonka 2019, chapter 8). For example, gastropod molluscs show rapid 
avoidance learning (Siegel and Jarvik 1974), and in the pond snail Lymnaea stag-
nalis second order conditioning of simple taste discrimination was observed (Sugai 
et al. 2006; for more tests see Benjamin and Kemenes 2010), but we are not aware of 
experiments testing for discrimination among compound stimuli by match to sample 
experiments. So, the claim that UAL is absent in these invertebrate taxa is very ten-
tative and could easily be refuted by future experiments. It is only when animals can 
succeed in a variety of the tasks that test the different elements of UAL that we can 
positively ascertain that the animal has the capacity for UAL, and is, by implication, 
at least minimally conscious. Such tests may lead us to expand or narrow the range 
of species (and possible phyla) which display UAL.
Testing (part of) Claim 4: UAL has trade‑offs and drove the evolution of traits 
that partially compensated for its costs
In addition to the predictions testing the relation between UAL and consciousness, 
the UAL framework suggests some evolutionary-developmental predictions. Based 
on palaeontological evidence of well-preserved fossil brains of arthropods and ver-
tebrates that exhibit the functional architecture of UAL, Ginsburg and Jablonka 
(2019) concluded that this form of learning evolved in these phyla during the mid-
Cambrian from a simple form of elemental associative learning (called limited asso-
ciative learning by Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019). The neural architecture of UAL 
suggests that its construction involved the evolution of dedicated memory structures 
for storing compound patterns of stimuli and actions, dedicated value systems, and 
a hierarchy of levels of sensory and motor integration units that enabled world and 
body mapping.
Associative learning was a leap in adaptability that can parsimoniously explain the 
major features of the Cambrian diversification (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2010b, 2019), 
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but we think the assumption that associative learning drove the Cambrian explo-
sion is not itself experimentally testable. What is testable is the hypothesis that 
UAL drove the evolution of mechanisms that partially compensated for the costs of 
over-learning engendered by UAL. These include mechanisms restricting the dura-
tion and effects of the stress response during ontogeny, mechanisms restricting the 
epigenetic inheritance of the effects of stress responses, and the evolution of active 
forgetting.
 (I) Co-evolution of learning and the stress response: We predict that these 
mechanisms started co-evolving in animals showing limited associative 
learning and brain centralization. We therefore expect to find evidence for 
the co-evolution of the gene regulatory networks (GRNs) underlying associa-
tive learning and the stress response. We also expect that genes involved in 
sophisticated stress responses may have been lost in animals such as penis 
worms (which seem to have lost their brain during evolution, though they 
still have a nervous system).
 (II) Restricting the prevalence of epigenetic inheritance of the effects of stress: 
We expect that mechanisms restricting the transgenerational transmission 
of the effects of stress to the next generation have evolved in animals dur-
ing the Cambrian, so it is likely that intergenerational inheritance of stress 
responses will be more common in animals with non-associative learning 
or limited associative learning than in animal manifesting UAL. Although 
the effects of neuro-hormonal destabilization following extreme trauma or 
persistent stress still have epigenetic, transgenerational effects (e.g., Jawaid 
et al. 2018) such inheritance is likely to have been more common during the 
early Cambrian. We therefore predict that widespread epigenetic inheritance 
will be found in sessile animals with rudimentary brains and in short-lived 
animals with central nervous systems such as Planaria and nematodes.
 (III) Co-evolution of active forgetting and UAL: We expect to find evidence for 
the co-evolution of the GRNs underlying active forgetting mechanisms with 
those underlying UAL, and trace back the origins of these GRNs to the co-
evolutionary dynamics of the Cambrian era.
Summary of the predictions
The claim that UAL is a natural cluster, in the sense that the different elements 
group together in UAL animals (claim 1), leads to the predictions that:
(a) The five elements of UAL (see Part I) are ontogenetically correlated. Devel-
opmental studies are expected to show that the development of one element 
facilitates or enables the development of one or more of the other elements.
(b) The five elements of UAL are phylogenetically correlated. Finding that a species 
has evolved one of the elements of UAL raises the probability that the species 
has evolved the whole UAL package.
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(c) The five elements of UAL are medically correlated. Brain injuries that affect one 
element will not leave the other elements completely unaffected, but may leave 
more limited forms of learning unaffected.
The claim that UAL is a transition marker for the transition to experiencing systems 
(claim 2) leads to the predictions that:
(d) Experimental protocols such as backward masking that selectively switch off 
conscious perception in humans, leaving unconscious perception in place, will 
selectively switch off UAL, while leaving more limited forms of learning in 
place.
(e) Blindsight patients will be unable to perform UAL on stimuli presented in the 
blind region of the visual field, but they may be capable of more limited forms 
of learning.
(f) The neural signatures of subjective experience in humans, whatever they turn 
out to be, will be correlated with UAL.
The claim that UAL (and thus conscious experience) is possessed by most verte-
brates, some arthropods, and the coleoid cephalopods (claim 3) leads to the predic-
tions that:
(g) Animals from these phyla will be able to discriminate between novel compound 
stimuli, exhibit the capacity for trace conditioning, second-order conditioning, 
reversal learning, spatial learning and pattern completion, evaluate action options 
that are context-dependent and make adaptive motivational trade-offs.
(h) In conditions equivalent to masking in humans the animals will fail in these 
tasks, although they will be still able to show simpler forms of learning.
The claim that the evolution of UAL had trade-offs and led to the evolution of new 
coping mechanisms (the most easily testable part of claim 4), leads us to predict 
that:
(i) Molecular changes in GRNs underlying the stress response and those underlying 
AL and UAL will be correlated.
(j) Epigenetic inheritance in animals exhibiting UAL will be more constrained than 
epigenetic inheritance in animals with simpler forms of learning.
(k) Molecular changes in the GRNs underlying AL and UAL and those underlying 
active forgetting will be correlated.
Discussion
One of the main attractions of the UAL approach is that it tries to cut through the 
noise of disagreement to find a hidden consensus. The idea is that, for all the disa-
greement, there is a consensus that a list of hallmarks of consciousness are jointly 
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sufficient (given the actual laws of nature) for consciousness. Much of the disagree-
ment is about which, if any, of those jointly sufficient conditions are also neces-
sary. However, there are some approaches to studying consciousness that are clearly 
opposed to the UAL framework, and we will close with a brief discussion of these.
First, the UAL approach, while compatible with many specific theories about the 
nature of consciousness, is not compatible with higher-order thought (HOT) theories 
of the type defended by Carruthers (2000), Rosenthal (2005) and LeDoux (2019). 
The core commitment of a HOT theory is that consciousness involves a system rep-
resenting its own mental states. Such theories posit that a mental state becomes phe-
nomenally conscious when it becomes the object of a higher-order representation. A 
higher-order theorist will simply deny that the hallmarks of consciousness listed in 
Part I suffice for consciousness. They will maintain that a crucial extra ingredient—
an ability to form representations of one’s own mental states—is needed. This is not 
the place for a detailed discussion of HOT theories. It is enough to say that they can-
not provide convincing evidence that this extra ingredient is in fact needed, and that 
they face significant problems explaining why this extra ingredient should be needed 
(Block 2011; Carruthers 2017).
For a higher-order theorist, the UAL approach casts the net too widely, counting 
as conscious many animals that (in their view) are probably not conscious. But some 
may have the opposite concern. Could the UAL approach be locating the transition 
to experiencing systems much too late in evolutionary history?
Some radical views regard conscious experience as a basic property of all life, or 
even all matter. The former view is “biopsychism” (a term coined by Haeckel 1892, 
p. 483; for a recent exposition see Reber 2018), the latter “panpsychism” (Goff 
2019). Such views are logically compatible with the UAL framework, since their 
defenders can agree that the list of hallmarks identified in Part I are sufficient for 
consciousness. They will just think that the hallmarks go far beyond what is neces-
sary. We’re not sure what a pan/biopsychist would say about our proposed transition 
marker, and we don’t want to prejudge that question. If they disagree with our pro-
posed transition marker and want to suggest a more basic one—one so minimal it 
can be possessed by unicellular organisms—they are welcome to do so. We can then 
evaluate the evidence that this alternative transition marker does indeed require a set 
of capacities that suffice for consciousness.
We should stress again a point made in Part I: according to the UAL framework, 
UAL is a positive marker of consciousness. It allows us to make a positive case for 
consciousness in some animals, but it is not intended to tell us which animals are 
not conscious. An approach based on positive markers leaves open the possibility 
that some animals have a form of consciousness that fails to generate the positive 
marker. So, readers who want from the UAL framework a definitive answer to the 
question “which animals are not conscious?” will be disappointed.
However, a similar issue arises for all major evolutionary transitions and innova-
tions (unless it is assumed that the capacity in question appeared all at once, in a 
saltational manner). When an evolutionary transition occurs, grey areas that elude 
definition are very likely to be found. The assignment of a mode of being (living, 
subjective experiencing, reflecting) to the entities in the grey areas will always 
be controversial. It is not clear, for example, whether we can call a very simple 
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autopoietic system (e.g., a chemoton that does not have a self-replicating polymer) 
alive. However, there are clear-cut cases on either side of the boundary. A bacterium 
is alive, whereas a single molecule of sugar is not alive—because life is a system-
level property, and none of the hallmarks of life are displayed by individual mol-
ecules in isolation.
We think the same is true for consciousness. There can be a consensus about 
systems that have sufficient conditions for consciousness, and a consensus about 
entities that do not have any member of any empirically supported set of sufficient 
conditions, despite substantial disagreement about borderline cases. The boundaries 
between modes of being are vague. Yet the study of systems which inhabit the grey 
areas is of crucial importance for the understanding of the evolutionary history of 
both life and consciousness.
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